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I. INTRODUCTION 
Article I, section 4 of the Minnesota Constitution provides 
litigants the right to unilaterally request a jury trial in civil cases.1  
This right, however, is not absolute.2  Both the plain language3 and 
the Minnesota Supreme Court’s interpretation of the constitutional 
guarantee recognize a difference between legal and equitable 
causes of action.4  The former may be submitted to a jury while the 
latter may not.5 
Recently, in United Prairie Bank-Mountain Lake v. Haugen 
Nutrition & Equipment, LLC, the Minnesota Supreme Court 
addressed whether a cause of action for the recovery of attorney’s 
fees bargained for in an indemnity contract is legal or equitable.6  
In a matter of first impression,7 the court concluded that this type 
of claim is legal in nature.8  The reasoning advanced is not 
controversial.  However, it places creditors in a difficult position 
moving forward.  Most notably, it means that in actions seeking to 
enforce loan agreements that include attorney fee provisions, 
debtors may request a jury determination as to the amount of 
attorney’s fees owed.  Whether this is a positive or negative has yet 
to be determined.9  It could be beneficial for creditors if juries are 
sympathetic to their case.  However, it is more likely to be viewed 
negatively.  Given that there has not been sufficient time to 
 
 1. MINN. CONST. art. I, § 4. 
 2. Mary F. Torpey, Right to Civil Jury Trial—“Looking Straight at Things”: State 
Constitution Does Not Guarantee Right to Jury Trial in Promissory Estoppel Case. Olson v. 
Synergistic Technologies Business Systems, Inc., 628 N.W.2d 142 (Minn. 2001), 33 
RUTGERS L.J. 1231, 1235 (2002). 
 3. See MINN. CONST. art. I, § 4 (applying only to cases “at law”). 
 4. Torpey, supra note 2, at 1235. 
 5. Id. 
 6. 813 N.W.2d 49 (Minn. 2012).  An indemnity contract is “[a] contract 
whereby one agrees to save another from the legal consequences of the conduct of 
one of the parties or some other person.”  BALLENTINE’S LAW DICTIONARY 608 (3d 
ed. 1969); see also 1 DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 3.10(3), at 402 (2d ed. 
1993); infra note 139.  The indemnity contract at issue in United Prairie Bank 
required the debtors, the Haugens and Haugen Nutrition & Equipment, LLC, to 
reimburse United Prairie Bank if it incurred attorney’s fees in any action for the 
protection or enforcement of its security interests.  United Prairie Bank, 813 N.W.2d 
at 52. 
 7. United Prairie Bank, 813 N.W.2d at 64 (Dietzen, J., dissenting). 
 8. Id. at 57 (majority opinion). 
 9. See Seth Leventhal, Judge or Jury: Who’s Better to Decide the Amount of 
an Award of Attorneys’ Fees? (Aug. 2, 2012) (on file with the author). 
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compile data,10 creditors would be well served to pay close attention 
to the result reached in United Prairie Bank. 
This article begins by analyzing the history of the civil right to 
a jury trial.11  It then turns to an examination of United Prairie Bank 
in relation to its historical backdrop.12  It critiques the Minnesota 
Supreme Court’s analysis13 and concludes with a discussion about 
the lesson to be learned as a result of United Prairie Bank.14  The 
lesson is that until there is evidence indicating how juries award 
fees, Minnesota creditors are advised to include provisions in loan 
agreements stating that contractual attorney fee disputes shall be 
decided by the court and not by a jury. 
II. HISTORY OF THE CIVIL RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL 
A. From the Magna Carta to the Bill of Rights 
The origins of the civil right to a jury trial can be traced to the 
Magna Carta, which was signed at Runnymede by King John on 
June 15, 1215.15  It guaranteed “no freeman would be disseized, 
dispossessed, or imprisoned except by judgment of his peers or by 
the ‘laws of the land.’”16  The provision proved popular, and by the 
early part of the seventeenth century it was a primary tenet of 
English liberty.17  The practice also proved well suited for the 
American colonies, which began to guarantee the right as early as 
1606.18  While the colonies were quick to provide the right, 
 
 10. Id. 
 11. See infra Part II. 
 12. See infra Part III. 
 13. See infra Part IV.A. 
 14. See infra Part IV.C–D. 
 15. Richard S. Arnold, Trial By Jury: The Constitutional Right to a Jury of Twelve 
in Civil Trials, 22 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 13 (1993).  Contra Charles W. Wolfram, The 
Constitutional History of the Seventh Amendment, 57 MINN. L. REV. 639, 653 n.44 
(1973) (citing commentary for the proposition that the framers of the United 
States Constitution agreed the civil right to a jury trial was traceable to the Magna 
Carta but “[h]istorians no longer accept [this] pedigree”). 
 16. Arnold, supra note 15, at 13; see also Wolfram, supra note 15, at 653. 
 17. Arnold, supra note 15, at 13. 
 18. Id. (“The 1606 Charter to the Virginia Company incorporated the right to 
a jury trial, and by 1624 all trials in Virginia, both civil and criminal, were by jury.  
In 1628, the Massachusetts Bay Colony introduced jury trials, and the right to a 
jury trial was codified in the Massachusetts Body of Liberties by 1641.  The Colony 
of West New Jersey implemented trial by jury in 1677, as did New Hampshire in 
1680 and Pennsylvania in 1682, under William Penn.  Massachusetts (1641), 
Rhode Island (1647), New Jersey (1683), South Carolina (1712), and Delaware 
3
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inclusion in the United States Constitution was more contentious. 
As originally drafted, the United States Constitution did not 
include any provision guaranteeing the civil right to a jury trial.19  
In fact, the issue was only briefly discussed during the 
Constitutional Convention at Philadelphia in 1787.20  Each time the 
right to a jury trial was addressed, it produced “conflicting 
reactions.”21  Those in favor of such a provision were concerned 
about corrupt judges22 and also safeguarding the right that had 
been established in the colonies.23  Those opposed argued that 
practices among the states varied so greatly that it would be 
impossible to adopt language satisfactory to every state.24  The 
opponents prevailed at the Constitutional Convention, but their 
success was short-lived. 
After the United States Constitution was signed and delivered 
to the Continental Congress on September 17, 1787, the country 
became divided over the Drafters’ failure to provide American 
citizens with a Bill of Rights.25  At the center of this dispute—
possibly even precipitating it26—was the failure to guarantee the 
civil right to a jury trial.27  Antifederalists, who supported a Bill of 
Rights, raised several concerns in this regard.  They primarily 
believed that without the right, judgment debtors would be at the 
mercy of federal judges, who were more likely to be of the same 
social class as judgment creditors.28  Antifederalist Judge Samuel 
Byran stated that judges are likely to have 
a bias towards those of their own rank and dignity; for it is 
not to be expected, that the few should be attentive to the 
rights of the many.  [The civil right to a jury trial] 
 
(1727) adopted the Magna Charta’s specific language.”).  Commentators have 
observed that the right was “probably the only one universally secured by the first 
American constitutions.”  Wolfram, supra note 15, at 655.  
 19. Margaret L. Moses, What the Jury Must Hear: The Supreme Court’s Evolving 
Seventh Amendment Jurisprudence, 68 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 183, 185 (2000). 
 20. Edith Guild Henderson, The Background of the Seventh Amendment, 80 HARV. 
L. REV. 289, 293–94 (1966) (noting the Framers only debated the issue twice 
during the entire Constitutional Convention); Wolfram, supra note 15, at 657–61. 
 21. Henderson, supra note 20, at 293–94. 
 22. Id. at 293. 
 23. Id.; Moses, supra note 19, at 185.  The argument was that the failure to 
guarantee the right essentially meant it had been abolished.   
 24. Moses, supra note 19, at 186. 
 25. Henderson, supra note 20, at 295. 
 26. Id. at 295; Wolfram, supra note 15, at 657. 
 27. Henderson, supra note 20, at 295. 
 28. Moses, supra note 19, at 186. 
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therefore preserves in the hands of the people, that share 
which they ought to have in the administration of justice, 
and prevents the encroachments of the more powerful 
and wealthy citizens.29 
Beyond protecting judgment debtors, Antifederalists were also 
concerned about granting federal judges unregulated power.30  
These arguments had significant appeal and ultimately resulted in 
the adoption of the Seventh Amendment to the United States 
Constitution.31 
The Seventh Amendment guarantees: 
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy 
shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall 
be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be 
otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, 
than according to the rules of the common law.32 
The provision is noticeably vague as to what it actually provides.33  
This appears to be in response to the concerns of Federalists who 
argued it would be difficult to draft language satisfactory to every 
state.34  It has been observed that a more expansive provision would 
not have survived the political process.35  The result of the vague 
language is that courts have delineated the scope of the right.36 
 
 29. Id. (emphasis added) (citing Wolfram, supra note 15, at 695–96 (quoting 
Letters of Centinel, No. II, FREEMAN’S J., Oct. 24, 1787, reprinted in PENNSYLVANIA AND 
THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 1787–1788, at 584 (John Bach McMaster & Frederick 
D. Stone eds., 1888))).  
 30. Id.  (“Other arguments advanced by the antifederalists in favor of civil jury 
trials included the need to guard against unwise legislation, presumably by jury 
nullification, the need to overturn the practices of courts of vice-admiralty, by 
which the British had imposed non-jury proceedings on the colonists, the 
protection of the interests of private citizens against the government, and the 
protection of individuals against overbearing and oppressive judges.” (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (citing Wolfram, supra note 15, at 670–71)). 
 31. Moses, supra note 19, at 186; see Henderson, supra note 20, at 298–99. 
 32. U.S. CONST. amend. VII. 
 33. Moses, supra note 19, at 186; Wolfram, supra note 15, at 639 (noting the 
“[S]eventh [A]mendment has presented its full share of interpretive and logical 
difficulties”).  See Henderson, supra note 20, for a further discussion of the 
Seventh Amendment’s vague language. 
 34. Henderson, supra note 20, at 294.  Federalists were also concerned that it 
“would be difficult to draft constitutional language that would distinguish 
intelligently between those cases in which a jury would be appropriate and those 
in which it would not.”  Wolfram, supra note 15, at 663. 
 35. Moses, supra note 19, at 186. 
 36. Id.  The focus of this article is the Minnesota Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of article I, section 4.  It includes some discussion of federal 
precedent, but centers on how Minnesota has interpreted its provision.  See 
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B. A Tale of Two Constitutions?  Minnesota’s Unique Story 
Minnesota drafted its constitution in 185737 and achieved 
statehood in 1858.38  It framed a constitution in the shadows of 
both the United States Constitution and the constitutions of the 
previously admitted states.39  Constitutional debates indicate that 
the framers were keenly aware of this fact and adopted a 
constitution individually tailored to Minnesota.40  One of the state’s 
most obvious departures from its federal counterpart is discernible 
 
Moses, supra note 19, at 187–217, for a detailed discussion of federal jurisprudence 
regarding the Seventh Amendment. 
 37. MARY JANE MORRISON, THE MINNESOTA STATE CONSTITUTION 1 (2002).  
Minnesota’s drafting story is interesting in and of itself.  Republicans and 
Democrats vehemently disagreed with one another over the scope and text of 
Minnesota’s constitution and, as a result, only met twice during the entire 
Constitutional Convention.  Id.  Rather than sorting out their differences, the 
parties separated and drafted their own documents.  Id.  Although the 
disagreement was significant, the parties’ final products were nearly identical.  Id. 
at 1–2.  A local newspaper published each party’s proceedings and because the 
drafting process was somewhat public, the parties made concessions to one 
another throughout.  Id. at 2.  The compromise committee was able to complete 
its work with relatively minor difficulties.  Id.  Some will say that because the 
Republicans and Democrats drafted separate documents, Minnesota actually has 
two constitutions.  Id. at 6.  Others disagree with this assertion claiming the only 
real difference is punctuation.  Id. 
 38. Id. at 6 (“Minnesota became the thirty-second state in 1858.”). 
 39. 7 HENRY W. MCCARR & JACK S. NORDBY, MINNESOTA PRACTICE: CRIMINAL 
LAW & PROCEDURE § 1.4 (4th ed. 2012).  The framers of the Minnesota 
Constitution were also operating in the shadows of the Northwest Ordinance, 
which was enacted by the First Congress under the United States Constitution.  
WILLIAM ANDERSON, A HISTORY OF THE MINNESOTA CONSTITUTION 9 (1921).  The 
ordinance, which applied to a region that included Minnesota, was simple and 
provided for a temporary government over the region, even though the territory 
that was to be Minnesota was uninhabited by people of European ancestry.  Id.  
Relevant to this article is the fact that the Northwest Ordinance guaranteed the 
civil right to a jury trial.  Id. at 10; MORRISON, supra note 37, at 4; Wolfram, supra 
note 15, at 656. 
 40. MCCARR & NORDBY, supra note 39, § 1:4.  The 1857 Constitution was not 
novel by any means, but contrary to some assertions, neither was it the product of 
cutting and pasting “provisions from the constitutions of other states.”  ANDERSON, 
supra note 39, at 4.  At least one commentator has stated:  
It is more nearly in conformity with the facts to say that from the first day 
that English-speaking white men set foot in the Northwest territory a 
course of events was begun which in the fullness of time dictated to the 
people of Minnesota some of the most important clauses in their 
constitution.  Furthermore, the experiences of the pioneers under the 
various territorial governments which succeeded each other in the 
control of the Minnesota country, constituted a very solid education in 
the fundamentals of administration in a new and undeveloped country. 
Id. 
6
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in its first article, which provides Minnesota’s Bill of Rights.41 
Beyond organization, the language used is also different.42  
This is particularly apparent in examining article I, section 4, which 
guarantees the civil right to a jury trial.43  The provision, in 
pertinent part, provides: “The right of trial by jury shall remain 
inviolate, and shall extend to all cases at law without regard to the 
amount in controversy.”44  The most apparent difference between 
this provision and the Seventh Amendment is that Minnesota does 
not require a minimum amount in controversy for the right to 
attach.45  While the difference in language is noteworthy, the more 
significant distinction is the way courts interpret the provisions.  In 
State v. Hamm, the Minnesota Supreme Court stated: 
It is important to remember that we sit today in our role 
as the highest court of the State of Minnesota interpreting 
our own constitution, framed and ratified by the people of 
this state.  While a decision of the United States Supreme 
Court interpreting an identical provision of the federal 
Constitution may be persuasive, it should not be 
automatically followed or our separate constitution will be 
of little value.46 
These are powerful words that have real importance.  Beyond 
ensuring that the state has a unique identity, the Seventh 
Amendment has not been incorporated into the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.47  Therefore, federal 
 
 41. MCCARR & NORDBY, supra note 39, § 1:4.  This, of course, is different from 
the United States Constitution, which states the Bill of Rights in its amendments. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. MINN. CONST. art. I, § 4. 
 45. Compare id., with U.S. CONST. amend. VII. 
 46. 423 N.W.2d 379, 382 (Minn. 1988). 
 47. Wolfram, supra note 15, at 645–46; James L. “Larry” Wright & M. Matthew 
Williams, Remember the Alamo: The Seventh Amendment of the United States Constitution, 
the Doctrine of Incorporation, and State Caps on Jury Awards, 45 S. TEX. L. REV. 449, 466 
(2004).  The doctrine of incorporation refers to the application of the Bill of 
Rights to state governments.  See JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 416 (8th ed. 2010).  As initially interpreted, the Bill of Rights 
did not apply to the states.  See Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243, 247 
(1833).  However, through the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, namely 
the Due Process Clause, the United States Supreme Court has applied many of the 
provisions to the states.  NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra.  This means that by infringing 
these provisions, state governments violate the United States Constitution.  Id.  
This also means that state governments do not run afoul of the United States 
Constitution when violating provisions that have not been incorporated.  Id.  As 
mentioned, the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial is one of the few 
7
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precedent interpreting the Seventh Amendment is merely 
persuasive authority in Minnesota.  As a result, the Minnesota 
Supreme Court’s interpretation of article I, section 4 is critical to 
understanding the constitutional right in Minnesota state courts. 
C. The Evolution of the Civil Right to a Jury Trial in Minnesota 
The intention of the Drafters in adopting article I, section 4 of 
the Minnesota Constitution “was clearly not to create a new right.”48  
Rather, the intention was “to preserve an old [right] against 
interference by the legislature.”49  In Whallon v. Bancroft, one of the 
first cases to interpret the constitutional guarantee,50 the court 
noted definitively that it has a twofold effect.51  First, it 
“recognize[s] the right of trial by jury as it existed in the Territory 
of Minnesota at the time of the adoption of the State 
Constitution.”52  Second, it recognizes that this right is “to 
continue . . . unimpaired and inviolate.”53  In considering the 
article I, section 4 right to a jury trial, Minnesota courts generally 
begin their analysis by reciting this language.54 
The Whallon twofold effect recognizes a difference between 
legal and equitable causes of action.55  At the time the Minnesota 
Constitution was adopted, a party was entitled to exercise the right 
only if the action was legal in nature.56  This interpretation stems 
 
provisions that has not been incorporated into the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  Id. at 416–17. 
 48. ANDERSON, supra note 39, at 159. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Torpey, supra note 2, at 1234. 
 51. 4 Minn. 109, 113 (1860). 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. See, e.g., Onvoy, Inc. v. Allete, Inc., 736 N.W.2d 611, 617 (Minn. 2007); 
Abraham v. Cnty. of Hennepin, 639 N.W.2d 342, 348 (Minn. 2002); Olson v. 
Synergistic Techs. Bus. Sys., Inc., 628 N.W.2d 142, 148 (Minn. 2001); Smith v. 
Bailen, 258 N.W.2d 118, 120 (Minn. 1977); Breimhorst v. Beckman, 227 Minn. 
409, 433, 35 N.W.2d 719, 734 (1949); Hawley v. Wallace, 137 Minn. 183, 187, 163 
N.W. 127, 129 (1917); Morton Brick & Tile Co. v. Sodergren, 130 Minn. 252, 254, 
153 N.W. 527, 528 (1915); In re Peters, 119 Minn. 96, 101–02, 137 N.W. 390, 392 
(1912); State ex rel. Styve v. Dist. Judge of Tenth Judicial Dist., 85 Minn. 215, 217–
18, 88 N.W. 742, 743 (1902); Lommen v. Minneapolis Gaslight Co., 65 Minn. 196, 
209, 68 N.W. 53, 54–55 (1896); Schmidt v. Schmidt, 47 Minn. 451, 452–53, 50 
N.W. 598, 599 (1891). 
 55. Abraham, 639 N.W.2d at 349; Olson, 628 N.W.2d at 154; Morton, 130 Minn. 
at 254, 153 N.W. at 528; Bond v. Welcome, 61 Minn. 43, 43–44, 63 N.W. 3, 3–4 
(1895); Torpey, supra note 2, at 1235. 
 56. Torpey, supra note 2, at 1235. 
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not only from tradition but also from the plain language of the 
constitutional guarantee, as it extends only to cases “at law.”57  
Minnesota authority has not elaborated thoroughly on why there is 
a difference between legal and equitable causes of actions.  
However, scholars examining the Seventh Amendment note the 
distinction stems from the common law separation of courts of law 
and courts of equity.58  Even though the courts have merged, both 
federal and state courts continue this historical separation.59 
The post-merger distinction can be problematic, especially 
when the cause of action involves both legal and equitable issues.60  
In this situation, the legal issues may be submitted to the jury, while 
the equitable issues remain within discretion of the trial court.61  
The same is true where a plaintiff brings forth a legal claim and the 
defendant’s counterclaim seeks equitable relief.62  However, simply 
because a cause of action raises a legal issue does not necessarily 
mean a party is entitled to a jury trial.63  Where a cause of action is 
primarily equitable in nature but also includes incidental legal 
relief, neither party is entitled to a jury trial as a matter of right.64  
For example, in Koeper the Minnesota Supreme Court found the 
plaintiff’s primary goal in bringing the action was to enjoin the 
defendant from overflowing water onto the plaintiff’s land.65  The 
plaintiff’s request for incidental damages was not sufficient to deem 
the action legal in nature.66  Similarly, in Indianhead Trucking the 
court found that the plaintiff brought suit for specific performance, 
and the fact that the action sought incidental damages was not 
sufficient to warrant a jury trial.67 
 
 57. See MINN. CONST. art. I, § 4. 
 58. 20 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE § 98 (2d ed. 2012). 
 59. Id. 
 60. MORRISON, supra note 37, at 42. 
 61. Morton Brick & Tile Co. v. Sodergren, 130 Minn. 252, 254–55, 153 N.W. 
527, 528 (1915). 
 62. See Crosby v. Scott-Graff Lumber Co., 93 Minn. 475, 478–79, 101 N.W. 
610, 611 (1904). 
 63. See Indianhead Trucking Line, Inc. v. Hvidsten Transp., Inc., 268 Minn. 
176, 192–93, 128 N.W.2d 334, 346 (1964); Koeper v. Town of Louisville, 109 Minn. 
519, 521–23, 124 N.W. 218, 218–19 (1910); Lace v. Fixen, 39 Minn. 46, 48–49, 38 
N.W. 762, 763 (1888). 
 64. See Indianhead Trucking, 268 Minn. at 194, 128 N.W.2d at 357; Koeper, 109 
Minn. at 522, 124 N.W. at 218.  
 65. 109 Minn. at 522–23, 124 N.W. at 219. 
 66. Id. at 522–23, 124 N.W. at 219. 
 67. 268 Minn. at 192–94, 128 N.W.2d at 346–47. 
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Courts initially determined whether a claim was legal or 
equitable solely by the language in the complaint.68  Over time, 
however, courts acknowledged that the complaint alone was too 
narrow and found that the civil right to a jury trial depended on 
the “nature and character of the controversy, determined from all 
the pleadings.”69  Examining the “nature and character of the 
controversy” requires courts to ask whether the type of action at 
issue would have been properly submitted to a jury when the 
Minnesota Constitution was adopted.70  The practice of reviewing 
the type of action has proven to be effective in resolving modern 
disputes because of the inherent difficulties of “analyz[ing] current 
practice and pleading in the context of 1850’s jurisprudence.”71  It 
is also effective as it responds to forms of relief that did not enter 
Minnesota’s legal arena until the twentieth century.72 
To make the determination of whether a cause of action is 
legal or equitable, the Minnesota Supreme Court has articulated a 
two-pronged test.73  In Abraham, it stated that courts must look at 
the “nature and character of the controversy”74 (i.e., the substantive  
nature of the claim) and also the “theory for relief.”75  This is the 
analysis used by the Minnesota Supreme Court in United Prairie 
Bank.76 
 
 68. See Williams v. Howes, 137 Minn. 462, 463, 162 N.W. 1049, 1049 (1917) 
(“The question of the character of the action is determined solely by the 
complaint.”); Morton Brick & Tile Co. v. Sodergren, 130 Minn. 252, 255, 153 N.W. 
527, 528 (1915) (examining the complaint to determine whether the action was 
equitable in nature); Shipley v. Belduc, 93 Minn. 414, 416, 101 N.W. 952, 953 
(1904) (“The decisive test whether an action is triable to the court or to a jury is to 
be determined upon an examination of the complaint . . . .”); Bond v. Welcome, 
61 Minn. 43, 44, 63 N.W. 3, 4 (1895) (“The pleadings in the case at bar, especially 
the answer, clearly disclose a case which is one of equitable cognizance, to be tried 
in the methods pertaining to courts of equity.  We do not, however, rest our 
decision in this case upon the proposition that the pleadings show that the action 
is an equitable one, but upon the ground that the complaint discloses it . . . .”).  
But see Fair v. Stickney Farm Co., 35 Minn. 380, 381, 29 N.W. 49, 49–50 (1886) 
(examining the complaint and answer to determine whether the action was 
equitable in nature). 
 69. Landgraf v. Ellsworth, 267 Minn. 323, 326, 126 N.W.2d 766, 768 (1964). 
 70. Abraham v. Cnty. of Hennepin, 639 N.W.2d 342, 349 (Minn. 2002) 
(referring directly to cases at law). 
 71. Olson v. Synergistic Techs. Bus. Sys., Inc., 628 N.W.2d 142, 149 (Minn. 
2001). 
 72. Id. 
 73. See Abraham, 639 N.W.2d at 350–53. 
 74. Id. at 350 
 75. Id. at 353. 
 76. United Prairie Bank-Mountain Lake v. Haugen Nutrition & Equip., 
10
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III. THE UNITED PRAIRIE BANK DECISION 
A. Factual Background 
In 2002, Defendants Leland Haugen and Ilene Haugen began 
to experience financial difficulties in connection with their feed 
mill business.77  Plaintiff United Prairie Bank agreed to provide 
relief to the Haugens by refinancing their debt obligations.78  The 
parties agreed to a plan that transferred some of the Haugens’ 
assets to a third party and created a new entity, Haugen Nutrition & 
Equipment, LLC (“HNE”), to purchase those assets.79  To 
effectuate the latter transfer, the Haugens borrowed $323,484.82, 
which was secured by commercial security agreements, personal 
guarantees, and a mortgage.80  Each security entitled United Prairie 
Bank to attorney’s fees if it instituted any collection action against 
the Haugens and HNE.81  The personal guarantees also obligated 
the Haugens and HNE to pay reasonable attorney’s fees and legal 
expenses incurred by United Prairie Bank for the “protection, 
defense or enforcement” of the personal guarantees in any 
litigation, bankruptcy, or insolvency proceedings.82 
In December 2003, an action was brought against the 
Haugens, HNE, the third party, and United Prairie Bank 
 
L.L.C., 813 N.W.2d 49, 54–56 (Minn. 2012).  In discussing this area of the law, 
Rule 38.01 of the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure is also relevant.  The Rule 
states: “In actions for the recovery of money only, or of specific real or personal 
property, the issues of fact shall be tried by a jury, unless a jury trial is waived or a 
reference is ordered.”  Id.  The rule appears in cases, but it has been interpreted in 
a way that it does not have an impact on the right to a jury trial guaranteed by 
article I, section 4 of the Minnesota Constitution.  See Olson, 628 N.W.2d at 154.  
Specifically, the court has determined that Rule 38.01 “does not enlarge or 
diminish the historical right.”  Id.  The sole issue of concern is whether the cause 
of action is legal or equitable.  Id.; see also 1A DAVID F. HERR & ROGER S. HAYDOCK, 
MINNESOTA PRACTICE: CIVIL RULES ANNOTATED § 38.4 (5th ed. 2012). 
 77. United Prairie Bank, 813 N.W.2d at 52. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id.  Specifically, the promissory notes accompanying the loans obligated 
the Haugens and HNE to pay attorney’s fees plus court costs if United Prairie 
Bank hired an attorney to collect the debt.  Id.  The mortgage required them to 
pay attorney’s fees and legal expenses in connection with any enforcement or 
protection action with respect to the mortgage.  Id.  Finally, the commercial 
security agreements obligated the Haugens and HNE to pay “reasonable attorneys’ 
fees and legal expenses” in connection with any action for the repossession of 
secured property.  Id. 
 82. Id. 
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challenging these transactions as fraudulent transfers.83  United 
Prairie Bank defended and incurred $117,110.24 in legal fees.84  In 
November 2004, United Prairie Bank notified the Haugens and 
HNE that they were in default on their loan payments.85  United 
Prairie Bank subsequently brought the action at issue to collect 
amounts due under the agreement.86  It also brought forth breach 
of contract claims for breach of the personal guaranties.”87  The 
prayer for relief sought damages as well as reasonable attorney’s 
fees and costs.88 
B. Lower Court Decisions 
At trial, the Haugens and HNE moved the court to have a jury 
determine the amount of attorney’s fees owed.89  The court denied 
the motion and awarded United Prairie Bank $403,821.82.90  The 
Haugens and HNE appealed, but the Minnesota Court of Appeals 
affirmed.91  In reaching its conclusion, the court of appeals noted, 
similar to prior decisions, that it could not identify authority from 
1857 involving a cause of action for contractual attorney’s fees.92  
However, it followed the analysis outlined above and addressed 
“whether ‘the nature and character of the controversy, as 
determined from all the pleadings and by the relief sought[,]’ 
indicate[d] that ‘the cause of action [was] one at law today.’”93 
The Haugens and HNE argued that United Prairie Bank’s 
claim was for breach of contract,94 which had already been 
recognized as legal in nature.95  United Prairie Bank conceded that 
 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. at 53. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id.  The court found United Prairie Bank was entitled $286,711.58 in 
attorney’s fees in the present action and an additional $117,110.24 in attorney’s 
fees incurred by United Prairie Bank in defending the earlier lawsuit.  Id. 
 91. Id.; see also United Prairie Bank-Mountain Lake v. Haugen Nutrition & 
Equip., LLC, 782 N.W.2d 263 (Minn. Ct. App. 2010). 
 92. See United Prairie Bank, 782 N.W.2d at 270 (referring to cases such as 
Abraham v. County of Hennepin, 639 N.W.2d 342, 348 (Minn. 2002) and Olson v. 
Synergistic Technologies Business Systems, Inc., 628 N.W.2d 142, 149 (Minn. 2001)). 
 93. Id. at 269 (quoting Abraham, 639 N.W.2d at 349).  
 94. Id. 
 95. See Landgraf v. Ellsworth, 267 Minn. 323, 327, 126 N.W.2d 766, 768 
(1965); Raymond Farmers Elevator Co. v. Am. Sur. of N.Y., 207 Minn. 117, 119, 
12
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a breach of contract claim is legal in nature, but that its claim did 
not implicate traditional breach of contract considerations.96  In 
resolving the dispute, the court of appeals looked to Minnesota 
precedent, but also relied heavily on federal case law.97  Specifically, 
the court applied the test used by the United States Supreme Court 
in Ross v. Bernhard.98 
In Ross, the Court held that “[t]o determine whether a party is 
entitled to a jury trial, . . . courts look to the ‘nature of the issue to 
be tried rather than the character of the overall action.’”99  A 
conclusion is reached “by considering (1) how the issue was 
customarily treated prior to the merger of the courts of law and 
equity (the ‘pre-merger’ custom), (2) the remedy sought, and (3) 
the abilities and limitations of juries.”100 
Examining these elements in turn, the court of appeals first 
cited federal authority to support the conclusion that the pre-
merger custom did not view a cause of action for contractual 
attorney’s fees as legal in nature;101 rather, it was an issue typically 
within the province of the trial court.102  As to the remedy sought, 
the court viewed United Prairie Bank’s action as one seeking 
damages in connection with the defendant’s failure to pay amounts 
due under the loan agreement.103  The court concluded that the 
issue of attorney’s fees was “collateral” to the underlying merits of 
the breach of contract claim.104  It essentially reasoned that 
attorney’s fees are not damages as a direct result of the breach.105  
 
290 N.W. 231, 233 (1940). 
 96. United Prairie Bank, 782 N.W.2d at 269. 
 97. Id. at 269–71. 
 98. Id.  
 99. Id. at 269 (quoting Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 538 (1970)). 
 100. Id. (citing Ross, 396 U.S. at 538 n.10). 
 101. Id. at 269–70.  To support this conclusion, the court of appeals relied on 
Kudon v. f.m.e. Corp., 547 A.2d 976 (D.C. 1988) and Resolution Trust Co. v. Marshall, 
939 F.2d 274 (5th Cir. 1991).  Specifically, the Resolution Trust court held that 
“[s]ince there is no common law right to recover attorneys fees, the Seventh 
Amendment does not guarantee a trial by jury to determine the amount of 
reasonable attorneys fees.”  939 F.2d at 279.  However, as will be discussed in Part 
IV.A, Minnesota has explicitly disagreed with this contention. 
 102. See United Prairie Bank, 782 N.W.2d at 270. 
 103. See id. 
 104. Id.  The court supported its “collateral” position by citing a federal district 
court decision that held “the issues of liability for attorneys’ fees and the 
reasonableness of any such award should be addressed separately from liability on 
the merits.”  Id. (quoting Redshaw Credit Corp. v. Diamond, 686 F. Supp. 674, 
676–77 (E.D. Tenn. 1988)). 
 105. See id. at 271. 
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With respect to the third factor, the abilities and limitations of 
juries, the court found that requiring the trial court to decide the 
amount of attorney’s fees owed was more practical and more 
efficient than leaving it to a jury.106 
Considering these factors as a whole and taking into account 
Minnesota precedent, the court of appeals drew a distinction 
between a cause of action seeking attorney’s fees as a result of a 
failure to provide a legal defense and a cause of action seeking 
attorney’s fees in connection with the nonpayment of amounts due 
under a promissory note.107  In the latter situation, which the court 
concluded was the type before it, the issue of attorney’s fees was 
ancillary to the merits of the underlying dispute.108  The court 
reasoned that because attorney’s fees were ancillary, the trial court 
was in a better position to determine the amount of attorney’s fees 
owed.109  The Haugens and HNE appealed, and the Minnesota 
Supreme Court granted review. 
C. The Minnesota Supreme Court 
The sole issue before the Minnesota Supreme Court was 
whether the Minnesota Constitution permitted a jury trial in an 
action to recover attorney’s fees provided by contractual 
agreement.110  It reversed the court of appeals and held that the 
Minnesota Constitution provided such a right because the recovery 
of damages under a breach of contract claim is legal in nature.111  
The court reached this result using the Abraham two-pronged test 
 
 106. Id. at 270.  In reaching this conclusion, the court found McGuire v. Russell-
Miller, Inc., 1 F.3d 1306 (2d Cir. 1993) particularly persuasive.  United Prairie Bank, 
782 N.W.2d at 271.  See Part IV.B for a thorough discussion of the practical 
abilities and limitations of juries. 
 107. See United Prairie Bank, 782 N.W.2d at 271. 
 108. See id.  The juxtaposition of these claims was based on the remedy sought.  
For the court of appeals, the failure to provide a legal defense was a breach of an 
obligation to reimburse, which entitled a party to attorney’s fees as damages 
incurred.  However, in an action to collect amounts due under a promissory note, 
the remedy was damages in the amount of the uncollected debt—attorney’s fees 
provided only “collateral” relief.  As will be discussed, this reasoning misconstrues 
basic contract law.  See infra Part IV.A; Part IV.B (discussing why courts err in 
drawing this distinction). 
 109. See United Prairie Bank, 782 N.W.2d at 271.  For the court of appeals, this 
also meant that trial courts were required to determine whether a party was 
entitled to recover attorney’s fees in the first place.  See id. 
 110. United Prairie Bank-Mountain Lake v. Haugen Nutrition & Equip., LLC, 
813 N.W.2d 49, 51 (Minn. 2012). 
 111. See id. at 52.  
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discussed above; it addressed the substantive nature of a 
contractual attorney’s fees action as well as the remedy sought.112 
The Minnesota Supreme Court, like the court of appeals, 
could not identify authority from 1857 involving a cause of action 
for contractual attorney’s fees.113  However, the court cited case law 
involving this type of action as early as 1863.114  The court 
connected this early authority with the situation in United Prairie 
Bank because the underlying theme in both was “contractual 
indemnity.”115  The court considered contractual indemnity an 
action “at law” because, like a simple breach of contract claim, it 
was an action for the “recovery of money based upon the promise 
to pay,”116 which had already been recognized as legal in nature.117 
The court then turned to the second prong: the nature of the 
remedy sought.118  It determined the claim for attorney’s fees was 
one seeking damages for the breach of the loan agreements.119  To 
support this position, the court found New Amsterdam, which 
involved a contractual indemnity action, particularly persuasive, as 
that court did not differentiate attorney’s fees from other issues 
that were submitted to the jury—each involved “the recovery of 
money.”120  The court bolstered this analysis by citing decisions that 
had found the recovery of money under ordinary breach of 
contract actions legal in nature.121  The court concluded that 
 
 112. Id. at 54–58; see supra notes 73–75 and accompanying text.  In applying 
the Abraham two-pronged test, the court rejected the Ross test adopted by the court 
of appeals.  United Prairie Bank, 813 N.W.2d at 60; see also infra Part IV.B. 
 113. United Prairie Bank, 813 N.W.2d at 54–55; supra note 92 and accompanying 
text.   
 114. United Prairie Bank, 813 N.W.2d at 54--55 (referring to Griswold v. Taylor, 
8 Minn. 342 (1863)).  See infra note 134 for a further discussion of Griswold. 
 115. United Prairie Bank, 813 N.W.2d at 55. 
 116. Id. at 55–56. 
 117. Id. at 56; New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Lundquist, 293 Minn. 274, 287, 198 
N.W.2d 543, 551 (1972) (“An action based on an indemnity agreement is for the 
recovery of money based upon the promise to pay and is therefore triable by a 
jury.”); Raymond Farmers Elevator Co. v. Am. Sur. Co. of N.Y., 207 Minn. 117, 119, 
290 N.W. 231, 233 (1940) (“A suit against a surety on the contract is an action for 
the recovery of money based upon the promise to pay.  Therefore it is triable by 
jury.”); Pierce v. Maetzold, 126 Minn. 445, 451, 148 N.W. 302, 304 (1914). 
 118. United Prairie Bank, 813 N.W.2d at 56. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. at 57.  The court’s use of traditional breach of contract cases includes 
Simler v. Conner, 372 U.S. 221, 223 (1963), which involved an action to determine 
the amount of fees due under a contingent fee retainer contract; Landgraf v. 
Ellsworth, 267 Minn. 323, 324–26, 126 N.W.2d 766, 767–68 (1964), which involved 
an action to recover commissions due under a contract; and Raymond Farmers 
15
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because the claim was seeking money damages, the analysis was 
complete.122 
IV. ANALYSIS 
The Minnesota Supreme Court reached the correct result in 
United Prairie Bank.  As stated, the court’s analysis is not 
controversial.  However, the opportunity to reach a different result 
was certainly present.  The court seemed cognizant of this fact as it 
rejected, at length, other theories advanced.123  The court chose the 
historical and textual analysis as opposed to the one that might 
have been more practical.124  As will be discussed, this was proper in 
light of precedent and basic logic.125 
This section begins with a critique of the court’s analysis.126  
Particularly, it focuses on how the court addressed the nature and 
character of the controversy as well as the remedy sought.127  It then 
turns to a discussion as to why the court correctly rejected other 
theories advanced, notably the third Ross factor.128  It concludes 
with an examination of how Minnesota creditors can protect 
themselves moving forward.129 
A. Correctly Concluding that the Nature and Character of the Controversy 
and the Remedy Sought are Legal in Nature 
Analyzing first the nature and character of the controversy, the 
court correctly noted that it cannot cite authority from 1857 
involving a cause of action for contractual attorney’s fees.130  
However, prior decisions have expressly stated “[t]he constitution is 
not frozen in time in 1857”131 and precedent permits an 
examination of whether the type of action permitted a jury trial 
 
Elevator Co., 207 Minn. at 119, 290 N.W. at 233, which involved an action against a 
surety seeking damages for losses stemming from an employee’s fraudulent 
conduct.  
 122. United Prairie Bank, 813 N.W.2d at 57. 
 123. See id. at 58–63. 
 124. Leventhal, supra note 9. 
 125. See infra Part IV.A–B.  
 126. See infra Part IV.A.  
 127. See infra Part IV.A. 
 128. See infra Part IV.B. 
 129. See infra Part IV.C–D. 
 130. See United Prairie Bank-Mountain Lake v. Haugen Nutrition & Equip., 
LLC, 813 N.W.2d 49, 55 (Minn. 2012). 
 131. Abraham v. Cnty. of Hennepin, 639 N.W.2d 342, 349 (Minn. 2002). 
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when the Minnesota Constitution was adopted.132 
The type of action at issue in United Prairie Bank is one for 
contractual indemnity.133  As stated, the court first recognized the 
validity of this type of provision in 1863 in Griswold.134  In that case, 
the issue of whether the cause of action was legal or equitable was 
not before the court.135  However, later decisions have provided 
clarity, stating definitively that a contractual indemnity claim is an 
action at law.136 
 
 132. Id.; Olson v. Synergistic Techs. Bus. Sys., Inc., 628 N.W.2d 142, 148–49 
(Minn. 2001). 
 133. See BALLENTINE’S LAW DICTIONARY 608 (3d. ed. 1969) (stating an 
indemnity contract is “[a] contract whereby one agrees to save another from the 
legal consequence of the conduct of one of the parties or of some other person.”); 
1 DOBBS, supra note 6, § 3.10(3), at 402–03; 10 C.J.S. Bills and Notes; Letters of Credit 
§ 98 (2012) (stating the issue of attorney’s fees pursuant to a promissory note 
obligating a debtor to pay a creditor’s attorney’s fees in the event of the debtor’s 
default involves many considerations, including “recognition of the fact that an 
agreement to pay an attorney’s fee is a contract of indemnification.”); 42 C.J.S. 
Indemnity § 1 (2012) (“An agreement to indemnify another is an agreement . . . in 
which the indemnitor promises to reimburse his or her indemnitee for loss 
suffered.”).  In this case, the Haugens and HNE agreed, inter alia, to indemnify 
United Prairie Bank for any attorney’s fees incurred in the protection or 
enforcement of their debt obligation.  United Prairie Bank, 813 N.W.2d at 51. 
 134. See Griswold v. Taylor, 8 Minn. 342, 344–45 (1863).  Similar to United 
Prairie Bank, 813 N.W.2d at 51, the contract at issue in Griswold provided for 
attorney’s fees in the event the lender brought a foreclosure action.  Griswold, 8 
Minn. at 342–43.  In upholding the contract, the court found the provision was “a 
stipulation [to] save the mortgagee harmless in the event of a forced collection[.]”  
Id. at 344.  While the term was not actually used, it is clear that this is an indemnity 
contract.  See supra note 133. 
 135. See generally Griswold, 8 Minn. 342.   
 136. See New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Lundquist, 293 Minn. 274, 287, 198 
N.W.2d 543, 551 (1972) (“An action based on an indemnity agreement is for the 
recovery of money based upon the promise to pay and is therefore triable by a 
jury.”); Raymond Farmers Elevator Co. v. Am. Sur. Co. of N.Y., 207 Minn. 117, 119, 
290 N.W. 231, 233 (1940) (“A suit against a surety on the contract is an action for 
the recovery of money based upon the promise to pay.  Therefore it is triable by 
jury.”); Pierce v. Maetzold, 126 Minn. 445, 451, 148 N.W. 302, 304 (1914).  While 
Minnesota has been unwavering in its view that contractual indemnity actions are 
legal in nature, the Minnesota Supreme Court does not appear to have addressed 
its substantive origins.  See generally New Amsterdam, 293 Minn. at 287, 198 N.W.2d at 
551; Raymond, 207 Minn. at 119, 290 N.W. at 233; Pierce, 126 Minn. at 451, 148 
N.W. at 304.  A review of Minnesota case law suggests that the issue was first 
addressed in Pierce.  See 126 Minn. at 451, 148 N.W. at 304.  While that court made 
conclusive statements that the action was legal in nature, it did not cite authority 
to support its position.  See id.  Later decisions have provided additional support 
for the proposition but have not expanded on the reasoning.  See generally New 
Amsterdam, 293 Minn. at 287, 198 N.W.2d at 551; Raymond, 207 Minn. at 119, 290 
N.W. at 233.  Federal authority has provided some guidance, finding that “it would 
be difficult to conceive of an action of a more traditionally legal character” than 
17
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After considering the nature and character of the controversy, 
the court turned to the remedy sought.137  In United Prairie Bank, 
the remedy was attorney’s fees,138 which can, in this case, be 
properly characterized as money damages pursuant to a contract.139  
In this context, the court correctly concluded that the remedy is 
legal in nature. 
Analysis of the damages at issue in United Prairie Bank involves 
an examination of basic contract law—specifically, expectation 
damages.140  “Expectation damages attempt to provide the non-
breaching party with the expected benefit of the contract, also 
known as the benefit of the bargain.”141  To recover expectation 
damages, a party is required to show that the damages were 
foreseeable at the time of contract formation.142  The issue of 
foreseeability has its roots in the famous English case Hadley v. 
Baxendale,143 which Minnesota expressly recognizes.144  That case 
provided two basic rules governing expectation damages.145  The 
non-breaching party should receive damages that may reasonably 
be considered as arising naturally from a breach of contract or 
those damages that may reasonably “have been in the 
 
“an action on a debt allegedly due under a contract.”  Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 
369 U.S. 469, 477 (1962).  The result is that the substantive origins of a contractual 
indemnity action are somewhat vague.  However, precedent clearly states that the 
nature and character of a contractual indemnity action is legal in nature.    
 137. United Prairie Bank, 813 N.W.2d at 56.   
 138. Id. at 53.   
 139. DOBBS, supra note 6, § 3.10(1), at 389 (recognizing that contractual 
attorney’s fees serve several different purposes, one of which is damages pursuant 
to a contract—the policy behind the fees as damages rationale is that without the 
ability to recover the fees, the aggrieved plaintiff is not made whole); 1 ROBERT L. 
ROSSI, ATTORNEYS’ FEES § 8.4 (3d ed. 2011) (“In actions involving indemnity, 
brought where the duty to indemnify is either implied by law or arises under a 
contract, reasonable attorney’s fees incurred in resisting the claim indemnified 
against may be recovered as part of the damages and expenses, since they are 
foreseeable consequences of the indemnitor’s wrongful conduct.” (footnote 
omitted)).  Contra id. (recognizing there is some authority to the contrary). 
 140. See 20 BRENT A. OLSON, MINNESOTA PRACTICE: BUSINESS LAW DESKBOOK, 
FORMATION AND OPERATION OF BUSINESSES § 7.41 (2011) (noting that an award of 
expectation damages is one of the primary remedies for breach of contract). 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. § 7.42.  The converse is also true.  Namely, a party not “liable in the 
event of a breach for the loss that he did not at the time of contracting have 
reason to foresee as a probable result of such a breach.”  Id. 
 143. Id.  
 144. Lassen v. First Bank Eden Prairie, 514 N.W.2d 831, 838 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1994) (citing Hadley v. Baxendale, (1854) 154 Eng. Rep. 145 (Exch.)). 
 145. 20 OLSON, supra note 140, § 7.42. 
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contemplation of both parties, at the time they made the contract, 
as the probable result of a breach.”146  The former are categorized 
as “general” damages while the latter are referred to as either 
“special” or “consequential” damages.147 
The damages sought in United Prairie Bank were general 
damages.  “General damages are [those] that are the obvious result 
of the breach of contract, or those that occur in the ordinary 
course of events.”148  The policy rationale behind general damages 
is that “the plaintiff should be awarded the value of the very thing 
promised.”149  In United Prairie Bank, the contract made clear that if 
an action was brought or defended, part of the remedy would be 
attorney’s fees.150  This provision was bargained for, and attorney’s 
fees as damages arose naturally from any breach.151  Therefore, the 
remedy is money damages pursuant to a contract.  Minnesota has 
made it clear that this type of remedy is legal in nature.152 
While the issue is fairly well settled, it must be noted that there 
is some Minnesota authority suggesting that in an action seeking a 
default judgment, the award of attorney’s fees is collateral to the 
underlying merits.  Specifically, in First State Bank of Grand Rapids v. 
Cohasset Wooden Ware Co., the Minnesota Supreme Court found that 
an attorney’s fees provision in a default action under a promissory 
note “is not a distinct cause of action.”153  Similarly, in Campbell v. 
Worman, the court described attorney’s fees as not “part of the 
original debt.”154  However, as stated by the Minnesota Supreme 
Court in United Prairie Bank, these propositions “[are] contrary to 
basic contract law.”155  The payment of attorney’s fees arises 
naturally from any breach of the loan documents.  The attorney’s 
fees provisions were presumably bargained for to ensure 
 
 146. Id. (citing Hadley, 154 Eng. Rep. 145). 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. 
 149. 3 DOBBS, supra note 6, § 12.2(3), at 41. 
 150. United Prairie Bank-Mountain Lake v. Haugen Nutrition & Equip., LLC, 
813 N.W.2d 49, 52 (Minn. 2012). 
 151. See id. 
 152. Landgraf v. Ellsworth, 267 Minn. 323, 327, 126 N.W.2d 766, 768 (1964) 
(finding a suit for the recovery of money pursuant to a contract dispute was legal 
in nature); Raymond Farmers Elevator Co. v. Am. Surety Co. of N.Y., 207 Minn. 
117, 119, 290 N.W. 231, 233 (1940) (finding that a suit against a surety on a 
contract seeks money damages and was therefore legal in nature). 
 153. 136 Minn. 103, 105, 161 N.W. 398, 399 (1917). 
 154. 58 Minn. 561, 564, 60 N.W. 668, 669 (1894). 
 155. United Prairie Bank, 813 N.W.2d at 59; see also id. at 62 n.7 (explicitly 
criticizing First State Bank of Grand Rapids and Worman). 
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compliance with the loan agreement.156  In the event of a breach, 
the remedy clearly included collecting attorney’s fees incurred.157  
In essence, the provision was bargained for to put United Prairie 
Bank in the same position it would have been in had no 
misconduct occurred.158  First State Bank of Grand Rapids and 
Worman are also concerning because they failed to take into 
account precedent on point.  Specifically, in Jones v. Radatz, the 
Minnesota Supreme Court explicitly stated: 
The suggestion . . . that a stipulation to pay attorney’s fees 
in case of suit relates merely to the remedy, is not sound.  
For the payee, if he recover[s] on that part of the 
promise, must recover, not because he is obliged to bring 
suit, but because it is part of the contract and obligation 
of the maker, on which the suit is brought, that he will pay 
them upon the specified contingency.159 
Therefore, the court in United Prairie Bank properly distinguished 
cases advancing the “collateral” position and determined that the 
remedy sought was money damages pursuant to a contract. 
B. Rejecting the Third Ross Factor 
In reaching its conclusion, the Minnesota Supreme Court also 
correctly rejected the third Ross factor to determine whether a 
cause of action is legal or equitable.  The factor, used by the court 
of appeals in United Prairie Bank, had its genesis in a footnote in the 
United States Supreme Court decision Ross v. Bernhard.160  
Specifically, the note stated: “As our cases indicate, the ‘legal’ 
nature of an issue is determined by considering, first, the pre-
merger custom with reference to such questions; second, the 
remedy sought; and third, the practical abilities and limitations of 
juries.”161  It should be apparent that the first two factors are nearly 
 
 156. DOBBS, supra note 6, § 3.10(3), at 401–02 (stating that attorney’s fees 
pursuant to an indemnity agreement serve a dual purpose: they sanction “some 
particular misbehavior [of the defendant] while at the same time compensating 
the plaintiff”). 
 157. See 20 OLSON, supra note 140, § 7.41. 
 158. Id. (“Expectation damages attempt to provide the non-breaching party 
with the expected benefit of the contract, also known as the ‘benefit of the 
bargain.’”). 
 159. 27 Minn. 240, 242, 6 N.W. 800, 800 (1880). 
 160. Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 538 n.10 (1970). 
 161. Id. (emphasis added). 
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identical to the Abraham two-pronged test.162  However, the third 
factor prompts an interesting discussion. 
The Minnesota Supreme Court has never expressly adopted 
the third Ross factor.163  The court of appeals made an attempt in 
United Prairie Bank,164 but the Minnesota Supreme Court quickly 
rejected its application, finding the United States Supreme Court 
has limited its use “to a narrow set of circumstances that are 
inapplicable here.”165  This assertion is correct.  The United States 
Supreme Court has stated the third Ross factor “is relevant only to 
the determination [of] whether Congress has permissibly entrusted 
the resolution of certain disputes to an administrative agency or 
specialized court of equity, and whether jury trials would impair the 
functioning of the legislative scheme.”166  It is quite clear that a 
cause of action for contractual attorney’s fees does not implicate 
these considerations. 
However, while the Minnesota Supreme Court rejected the 
third Ross factor, it must be clearly stated that the court had the 
opportunity to consider it for three reasons.  First, although the 
court has never expressly adopted the third Ross factor, it has, at 
least once, considered the practical abilities and limitations of 
juries in analyzing whether a claim was legal or equitable.167  Thus, 
the court had at least some basis for adopting the third Ross factor.  
Second, the Seventh Amendment is not incorporated into the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution.168  Therefore, the Minnesota Supreme Court was not 
bound by the United States Supreme Court’s narrow application.  
Third, even though the Minnesota Supreme Court was not bound 
by federal precedent, if the court wanted to adopt the third Ross 
 
 162. See Abraham v. Cnty. of Hennepin, 639 N.W.2d 342, 349 (Minn. 2002); 
supra Part IV.A. 
 163. United Prairie Bank–Mountain Lake v. Haugen Nutrition & Equip., LLC, 
813 N.W.2d 49, 60 (Minn. 2012).   
 164. United Prairie Bank–Mountain Lake v. Haugen Nutrition & Equip., LLC, 
782 N.W.2d 263, 269 (Minn. Ct. App. 2010). 
 165. United Prairie Bank, 813 N.W.2d at 60 (referencing Chauffeurs, Teamsters 
& Helpers, Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 565 n.4 (1990)). 
 166. Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers, 494 U.S. at 565 n.4 (citation omitted). 
 167. E.g., Georgopolis v. George, 237 Minn. 176, 186, 54 N.W.2d 137, 143 
(1952) (“[T]he transactions testified to were so detailed and so many documents 
were introduced in evidence that decisions on the proposed questions would have 
been very difficult for a jury.”).  While this language is used in the decision, the 
Minnesota Supreme Court makes it clear that the cause of action is equitable in 
nature.  Id. 
 168. See supra note 47 and accompanying text. 
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factor, it could have looked to federal decisions applying it for 
persuasive support.  For example, in McGuire v. Russell-Miller, Inc., 
which is factually similar to United Prairie Bank, the Second Circuit 
Court of Appeals relied heavily on the practical abilities and 
limitations of juries in determining whether a cause of action was 
legal or equitable.169  The result of these three considerations is that 
the Minnesota Supreme Court had the opportunity to adopt the 
third Ross factor.  As stated, the court rejected the factor on the 
grounds that the United States Supreme Court has limited its 
application.170  However, a detailed analysis of the reasoning 
advanced in support of the third Ross factor, most notably as 
explained in McGuire v. Russell-Miller, shows it is flawed.  
Minnesota’s rejection of the factor was correct, even if the court 
did so for a different reason. 
Similar to United Prairie Bank, McGuire v. Russell-Miller 
addressed a contractual indemnity action involving attorney’s 
fees.171  The relevant contractual provision was breached, and the 
issue became whether the trial court should have submitted the 
issue of attorney’s fees to the jury.172  The court acknowledged that 
the matter was one of first impression for the circuit173 and 
ultimately adopted a bifurcated approach: the question of liability 
for attorney’s fees should be submitted to the jury, but the question 
as to the amount of attorney’s fees owed was a matter properly 
resolved by the trial court.174 
In reaching its conclusion with respect to the amount of 
attorney’s fees owed, the McGuire court made the bald assertion 
that determining the amount of attorney’s fees, in this situation, 
involved equitable issues of accounting, which is not a legal 
 
 169. 1 F.3d 1306, 1315–16 (2d Cir. 1993).  What is interesting about McGuire is 
that it was decided less than five years after the court narrowed the third Ross 
factor’s applicability.  See Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers, 494 U.S. at 565 n.4; 
Granfinciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 42 n.4 (1989).  Whether this was 
proper in light of prior precedent is certainly debatable.  However, because 
Minnesota is not bound by the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation, it 
could have used McGuire as a basis for adopting the third Ross factor. 
 170. United Prairie Bank, 813 N.W.2d at 60.  
 171. McGuire, 1 F.3d at 1309.  Specifically, that court addressed a contract that 
provided attorney’s fees to the plaintiff in the event it brought an action against 
the defendant for breach of any warranty or representation made in connection 
with the agreement.  Id. 
 172. Id. at 1310. 
 173. Id. at 1313. 
 174. Id. 
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remedy.175  The court also stated that the issue as to the amount of 
attorney’s fees was collateral to the underlying merits.176  While 
these contentions are advanced, both the majority and concurring 
opinions relied heavily on the third Ross factor, the practical 
abilities and limitations of juries, to find the bifurcated approach is 
the proper way to resolve the case. 
The McGuire court appeared troubled by the notion of 
allowing a jury to decide the amount of attorney’s fees owed.  The 
majority stated: 
To compute a reasonable amount of attorneys’ fees in a 
particular case requires more than simply a report of the 
number of hours spent and the hourly rate.  The 
calculation depends on an assessment of whether those 
statistics are reasonable, based on, among other things, 
the time and labor reasonably required by the case, the 
skill demanded by the novelty or complexity of the issues, 
the burdensomeness of the fees, the incentive effects on 
future cases, and the fairness to the parties.177 
Judge Jacobs, in his concurrence, was concerned about whether a 
jury could focus on the underlying merits of the claim when it was 
also considering the issue of reasonable attorney’s fees.  Judge 
Jacobs concluded: 
For jurors, the attorney’s fee issue will almost always be a 
different and disconcerting way of looking at the merits.  
Prevailing counsel should not have to disclose to the jury 
the need for in limine motions, the protective efforts 
employed in discovery, the pursuit of settlement, or the 
toil and calculation required to build a case that may have 
been promoted to the same jury as simple or self-
evident.178 
After finding the practical abilities and limitations of juries were 
significant enough to remove the issue from their consideration, 
the court stated that adopting this approach is “efficient.”179  The 
court concluded that “[j]udges are better equipped than juries to 
make computations based on details about billing practices, 
 
 175. See id. at 1314. 
 176. Id. at 1315. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. at 1317 (Jacobs, J., concurring); see also Gene F. Zipperle, Jr. & 
Timothy D. Martin, Rolling the Dice: Jury Trials—Reasonable Attorney’s fees And 
Expenses, FOR DEF., Mar. 2008, at 26.   
 179. McGuire, 1 F.3d at 1316 (majority opinion). 
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including rates and hours charged on a particular case.”180  For the 
McGuire court, the converse was also true in that requiring juries to 
make this determination would needlessly increase fees.181  Finally, 
the court in McGuire reasoned that leaving the amount of attorney’s 
fees to the jury would require the jurors to keep accurate totals 
throughout the trial, whereas the judge could make this 
determination with “perfect hindsight.”182 
While the McGuire reasoning seems persuasive on its face, its 
logic falls apart when considering a “free-standing” action for 
contractual attorney’s fees.  The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals 
recognized this distinction in J.R. Simplot v. Chevron Pipeline Co.183  In 
Simplot, the parties entered into an agreement for Simplot to 
purchase a pipeline from Chevron.184  The agreement was complex, 
but it provided a provision that Chevron would hold Simplot 
harmless in any pre-closing action against the pipeline.185  Simplot 
defended a pre-closing action and notified Chevron of its 
contractual obligation to reimburse.186  Chevron refused and 
Simplot brought the action at issue.187  At trial, Chevron moved the 
court to have a jury determine the amount of fees to be awarded.188  
The trial court denied the request and awarded Simplot attorney’s 
fees.189  On appeal, the court began its analysis by noting the 
posture of the case—the action was for the breach of a promise to 
reimburse, i.e., a straightforward breach of contract claim.190  The 
 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. (“[I]f the parties submitted evidence of the amount of attorneys’ fees 
to a jury at trial, the time spent acculturating the jury to the mysteries of attorneys’ 
hourly rates and incidental charges, and cross-examining about those matters, 
would likely increase fees and generate inconsistent awards.”). 
 182. Id. 
 183. 563 F.3d 1102 (10th Cir. 2009).   
 184. Id. at 1106.  
 185. Id.  
 186. Id. at 1107.  
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. at 1108. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. at 1116.  The court noted that the present dispute was more “like an 
insurance case where the insurer has breached its duty to defend a lawsuit against 
the insured by a third party and the insured sues the insurer for payment of the 
costs of its defense, particularly attorneys’ fees.”  Id. at 1117.  A “free-standing” 
cause of action for contractual attorney’s fees was also at issue in United Prairie 
Bank; however, the court did not recognize it.  This second cause of action arose 
because the loan documents required the Haugens and HNE to pay all costs and 
expenses incurred in defending the loan agreements.  United Prairie Bank-
Mountain Lake v. Haugen Nutrition & Equip., LLC, 813 N.W.2d 49, 51–52 (Minn. 
24
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 1 [2012], Art. 11
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol39/iss1/11
  
2012] CIVIL RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL 269 
court then distinguished the situation in McGuire, simply stating 
that it did not involve a “free-standing” attorney’s fees claim.191 
The court in Simplot distinguished McGuire, but what it should 
have done is point out the inconsistency that results in nearly 
identical situations.  That inconsistency is essentially that a jury is 
not capable of awarding attorney’s fees in a case involving a default 
action under a loan agreement, but it is capable when addressing a 
“free-standing” contractual attorney’s fees claim.  The court in 
McGuire correctly noted that “[t]o compute a reasonable amount of 
attorneys’ fees in a particular case requires more than simply a 
report of the number of hours spent and the hourly rate.”192  
However, to say that a jury is competent to handle this task in one 
situation but not the other defies logic.  The only difference is the 
timing of when the jury actually hears the issue.  The same goes for 
the argument that “the attorney’s fee issue will almost always be a 
different and disconcerting way of looking at the merits.”193  In fact, 
there are a number of occurrences during the course of a trial that 
might result in the jury having a favorable or unfavorable view of 
the underlying merits, but that has always been a consideration 
with jury trials.194  The McGuire reasoning simply does not wash 
when considering the entire spectrum of situations where a jury 
might need to decide both liability for and the amount of 
attorney’s fees due.  Once past this issue, the court in McGuire 
 
2012).  This provision was breached when United Prairie Bank defended the 
earlier action and was not reimbursed.  Id. at 52.  Thus, United Prairie Bank had a 
separate, “free-standing,” cause of action for breach of contract.  The Abraham two-
pronged test once again applies, and it is clear that a “free-standing” breach of 
contract claim is legal in nature.  See Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 477 
(1962) (“As an action on a debt allegedly due under a contract, it would be 
difficult to conceive of an action of a more traditionally legal character.”); J.R. 
Simplot, 563 F.3d at 1116.  The decision not to address the “free-standing” claim 
does not change the analysis, but it is worthwhile to point out.  In considering this 
issue, Simplot is discussed because that court’s analysis is more robust.     
 191. J.R. Simplot, 563 F.3d at 1116–17 (citing McGuire v. Russell Miller, Inc., 1 
F.3d 1306 (2d Cir. 1993)). 
 192. McGuire, 1 F.3d at 1315.  
 193. Id. at 1317 (Jacobs, J., concurring). 
 194. See Scott Kitner, Note, The Need and Means to Restrict Spectators from Wearing 
Buttons at Criminal Trials, 27 REV. LITIG. 733, 768 (2008) (arguing that allowing 
spectators to wear lapel buttons in the courtroom during trials allows the jury to 
decide guilt on the basis of issues outside the merits of the prosecution’s case); see 
also Sierra Elizabeth, Note, The Newest Spectator Sport: Why Extending Victims’ Rights to 
the Spectators’ Gallery Erodes the Presumption of Innocence, 58 DUKE L.J. 275, 308–09 
(2008). 
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resorts to an efficiency argument.195  However, in this country, we 
have a strong tradition of supporting the constitutional right to a 
jury trial, even though other procedures might be more efficient.196 
What the Simplot analysis recognized is that a “free-standing” 
claim for contractual attorney’s fees is one of the most traditional 
legal claims imaginable.  The court in Simplot was aware that to take 
the issue away from the jury would have been to fly in the face of 
hundreds of years of precedent.197  Analyzing a “free-standing” 
contractual attorney’s fees action, such as the one in Simplot, sheds 
light on why the court in United Prairie Bank correctly rejected the 
third Ross factor, even if it did so for a different reason.198  To do so 
might have been more efficient, but not constitutionally sound.199 
 
 195. McGuire, 1 F.3d at 1316 (majority opinion). 
 196. See Sioux City & P. R. Co. v. Stout, 84 U.S. 657, 664 (1873) (“It is assumed 
that twelve men [and women] know more of the common affairs of life than does 
one man [or woman], that they can draw wiser and safer conclusions from 
admitted facts thus occurring than can a single judge.”); Jefferson Nat’l Bank v. 
Cent. Nat’l Bank, 700 F.2d 1143, 1150 (7th Cir. 1983) (“In close cases where there 
is a doubt . . . the court should favor of [sic] the granting of a jury trial to insure  
[sic] constitutional rights.” (quoting Dixon v. Nw. Nat’l Bank, 297 F. Supp. 485, 
489 (D. Minn. 1969))); THE FEDERALIST No. 83, at 521 (Alexander Hamilton) 
(Benjamin Fletcher Wright ed., 1961), available at http://www.constitution.org 
/fed/federa83.htm (“The friends and adversaries of the plan of the convention, if 
they agree in nothing else, concur at least in the value they set upon the trial by 
jury; or if there is any difference between them it consists in this: the former 
regard it as a valuable safeguard to liberty; the latter represent it as the very 
palladium of free government.”).  
 197. The inference that the court is cognizant that a breach of contract claim 
is a straightforward legal issue comes from the fact that after stating this general 
proposition, the court supports it with a long string cite of cases recognizing the 
proposition.  See J.R. Simplot v Chevron Pipeline Co., 563 F.3d 1102, 1115 (10th Cir. 
2009).  It may be a stretch to assume that the court realized that to take this issue 
away from the jury would not comport with established precedent but, given the 
context of the case, the inference can be made.  
 198. As stated above, the reason is that the United States Supreme Court has 
limited the third Ross factor “to a narrow set of circumstances that are inapplicable 
here.”  United Prairie Bank-Mountain Lake v. Haugen Nutrition & Equip., LLC, 
813 N.W.2d 49, 60 (Minn. 2012).  The United States Supreme Court has stated 
that the third Ross factor “is relevant only to the determination whether Congress 
has permissibly entrusted the resolution of certain disputes to an administrative 
agency or specialized court of equity, and whether jury trials would impair the 
functioning of the legislative scheme.”  Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers, Local 
No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 565 n.4 (1990) (internal quotations omitted).   
 199. Beyond what has been already stated, the third Ross factor has been 
criticized on other grounds as well.  Notably, Minnesota legal scholar Charles W. 
Wolfram challenged the United States Supreme Court’s adoption of the third Ross 
factor, stating:  
Several difficulties with such a functional approach are apparent.  First, 
no one has successfully isolated those functions which the jury is 
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Given that the court reached the correct decision in light of its 
article I, section 4 precedent, the question becomes, what does this 
mean for Minnesota creditors moving forward? 
C. The Hometown Jury: A Warning to Minnesota Creditors Seeking 
Contractual Attorney’s Fees 
The result reached in United Prairie Bank should caution 
creditors, as it is now clear that a party can unilaterally request a 
jury trial in any action involving the recovery of contractual 
attorney’s fees.200  The concern for creditors should be made 
apparent by the opening two paragraphs of the Haugens’ and 
HNE’s brief filed with the Minnesota Supreme Court, which states: 
The tragedy which has befallen the Haugens and their 
family in this case is largely a function of out-of-control 
attorneys’ fees.  Because the notes, mortgages and 
guarantees signed by Leland Haugen, Iene [sic] Haugen, 
Haugen Nutrition and Equipment, Inc., and other entities 
belong to or controlled by Leland and Ilene Haugen 
contained clauses permitting United Prairie Bank to 
charge costs of collection and reasonable attorneys’ fees, 
UPB took advantage.  While the Haugens could have paid 
off their obligations absent the huge amount awarded 
UPB in attorneys fees, the size of this award has made it 
impossible for them to do so. 
       As the District Court’s analysis of its attorney fee 
award indicates, the ultimate amount of that award is 
subjective.  A rural jury, while it would certainly have 
upheld the clear and legitimate costs a bank might have 
incurred in enforcing a debt on a farm, is unlikely to have 
been as generous in an area as subjective and nebulous as a 
 
supposed to perform under the [S]eventh [A]mendment, at least not to 
the satisfaction of any substantial audience.  Second, to the extent that 
such an approach would be used both to expand and to contract the jury 
trial right, the functional approach might be thought to raise the spectre 
of federal judges using a disturbingly broad discretion in their 
determination of whether a jury ought to be interposed in particular 
cases.  Finally, it seems clear that one of the purposes of the right of jury 
trial in civil cases is to place limitations upon judges.  It thus might be 
thought to be particularly inappropriate in this instance for federal 
courts to claim a broad and loosely structured power to determine 
whether this civilian check on their own functioning should be 
interposed.   
Wolfram, supra note 15, at 644. 
 200. See United Prairie Bank, 813 N.W.2d at 51. 
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determination of attorneys’ fees.  Indeed, the failure of the 
District Court to permit a jury determination of this issue 
is the single most important factor in the size of the award 
to UPB.201 
What should be most concerning to creditors about these 
statements is that it appears the Haugens’ and HNE’s goal in this 
litigation was to get the matter before a “rural jury” who, at least 
from their perspective, would not award the amount of attorney’s 
fees due because of the hardship that has befallen them.  It is 
alarming because the statement, which is unsupported by any legal 
authority whatsoever, is essentially advocating for a hometown jury 
to find in favor of a hometown debtor.  The trial strategy would 
likely play out along the same lines, with the defendants attempting 
to portray the plaintiff as running up its fees simply because it 
can.202  It is debatable whether this strategy would be effective, but it 
is certainly concerning that the Haugens and HNE would state 
their presumable goal so boldly.  The concern for creditors should 
be the possibility of being faced with a similar situation. 
In light of the result reached in United Prairie Bank, how should 
Minnesota creditors who want to collect attorney’s fees for the 
protection or enforcement of a security interest proceed? 
D. Reasonable Attorney’s Fees with a Twist: Agreeing to a Court Trial 
Despite the decision in United Prairie Bank, provisions allowing 
creditors to recover reasonable attorney’s fees for the protection of 
a security interest or enforcement of amounts due under a loan 
agreement are still desirable; it allows creditors to be reimbursed 
for costs incurred for “enforcing a legal right against a debtor who, 
by his [or her] own default, obliges the creditor to act.”203  
Moreover, while attorney’s fees are limited to what is reasonable,204 
 
 201. Appellants’ Brief & Appendix at 7–8, United Prairie Bank, 813 N.W.2d at 49 
(No. A09-0607) (emphasis added). 
 202. United Prairie Bank’s brief is critical of the contention that it 
unnecessarily ran up attorney’s fees.  See Respondent’s Brief & Appendix at 39–40, 
United Prairie Bank, 813 N.W.2d at 49 (No. A09-0607).  Specifically, it points out 
that the Haugens and HNE vigorously defended the collection action.  Id.  As a 
result of this defense, United Prairie Bank incurred substantial attorney’s fees 
litigating various matters in order to obtain its lower court victories.  Id. 
 203. Comment, Stipulations for Attorney’s Fees, 37 YALE L.J. 490, 491 (1928). 
 204. ROSSI, supra note 139, § 9:39.  The amount of reasonable attorney’s fees 
generally depends on a number of considerations, including “the amount in 
controversy, the number and seriousness of the questions involved, the difficulties 
encountered in prosecuting the action, as well as time and labor employed.”  Id.   
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these provisions allow a party to recover all reasonable attorney’s 
fees incurred—the benefit obviously being that predicting which 
agreements might result in complex litigation, such as that in 
United Prairie Bank, is difficult, to say the least.205  With that said, 
creditors in Minnesota would be well served, when including 
provisions seeking reasonable attorney’s fees in connection with 
the protection of security interests or in actions for the 
enforcement of obligations to pay amounts due, to also include a 
provision in the agreement for a court trial in any action contesting 
the amount of attorney’s fees owed.206  This measure allows 
creditors not only to obtain all reasonable fees but also protects 
against the possibility that a jury might improperly award attorney’s 




 205. The situation presented in United Prairie Bank presents a nice illustration 
of why liquidated damages can be a problem for creditors seeking to be 
reimbursed for attorney’s fees.  Liquidated damages are efficient because the 
remedy is predictable in the event of a breach.  OLSON, supra note 140, § 7.45.  
However, in situations such as United Prairie Bank, where the trial court determined 
that United Prairie Bank was entitled to $403,821.82, it is unlikely that a liquidated 
damages provision would provide a creditor adequate relief.  The converse is 
obviously also true: in some actions, liquidated damages would result in a windfall 
to creditors.  However, in considering the potential windfall, it must be cautioned 
that “[i]f the liquidated damages clause provides for an amount of damages that 
are grossly disproportionate to the damages actually incurred, the clause will be 
held unenforceable, even if at the time the clause was inserted into the contract it 
appeared to be a reasonable estimation of damages.”  Id.  Therefore, reasonable 
attorney fee provisions are the desirable approach.   
 206. 33 FEDERAL PROCEDURE § 77:128 (Lawyers Ed. 2012) (“There is no abstract 
public policy against contractual waiver of the right to civil jury trial.  Agreements 
waiving the right to trial by jury are neither illegal nor contrary to public policy.  
Parties to a contract may by a prior written agreement, which is knowingly and 
voluntarily entered, execute a waiver to the right to jury trial.  A contract 
provision—made independently of litigation—for waiver of a jury trial is 
enforceable, but it is strictly and narrowly construed.” (emphasis added) 
(footnotes omitted)).  See generally Hoene v. Jamieson, 289 Minn. 1, 7, 182 N.W.2d 
834, 838 (1970) (recognizing that stipulations that only affect legal rights may be 
effective, but that stipulations regarding matters of law are not binding on the 
court); 4 RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 8:50 (4th ed. 2012); 23 
RONALD I. MESHBESHER, MINNESOTA PRACTICE: TRIAL HANDBOOK FOR MINNESOTA 
LAWYERS § 2.27 (2011) (citing Lane v. Lenfest, 40 Minn. 375, 376, 42 N.W. 84, 85 
(1889) (recognizing the validity of stipulations that certain issues be decided by 
the court in Minnesota)).   
 207. See TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 474 (1993) 
(O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“[J]urors are not infallible guardians of the public 
good.  They are ordinary citizens whose decisions can be shaped by influences 
impermissible in our system of justice.”). 
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specifically the costs incurred by those clients, attorneys drafting 
attorney’s fees provisions in loan documents would be well served 
to consider this option in light of United Prairie Bank. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In United Prairie Bank, the Minnesota Supreme Court must be 
commended for reaching the correct result in light of its article I, 
section 4 jurisprudence.  The court correctly analyzed the nature 
and character of the controversy as well as the remedy sought to 
properly determine that a cause of action for contractual attorney’s 
fees pursuant to an indemnity contract is legal in nature.  While the 
court did not totally refute analysis advanced by other jurisdictions, 
such reasoning was not advanced in Minnesota. 
However, creditors should be cautious moving forward.  
Attorneys drafting loan agreements should consider the events that 
unfolded in United Prairie Bank.  Most significantly, it appears that 
some debtors believe they can have success litigating the amount of 
attorney’s fees in front of a jury.  It is unclear whether the strategy 
will be successful, but it appears to be wise to avoid this possibility.  
Attorneys drafting loan agreements should pay close attention to 
the result reached in United Prairie Bank and strongly consider 
including provisions in indemnity agreements stating the court, and 
not a jury, shall resolve attorney fee disputes. 
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